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The "Essentially Local" Doctrine and
Section 1 of the Sherman Act
Myron N. Krotinger
A symposium devoted to state antitrust law would be incomplete
without consideration of the local activities which may remain unaffected by the sweep of federal antitrust laws operating under the broad
aegis of the commerce clause of the federal constitution.'
THE PROBLEM

Section 1 of the Sherman Act encompasses "every contract, combination in the form of trust or
otherwise, or conspiracy, in reTHE AUTHOR (M.A., LL.B., Columbia Universtraint of trade or commerce
sity) is a practicing attorney in Cleveland, Ohio
"2
among the several states ..
and a member of the faculty of the Western
Reserve University School of Law, specializing
In 1947, the Supreme Court
in trade regulation. He has written articles for
declared in the first United
various legal periodicals and is a member of
the Antitrust Law Committee of the Ohio State
Bar Association. Mr. Krotinger belongs to the

States v.Yellow Cab Co.3 case
that a "restraint on or mo-

Cleveland, Cuyahoga County, Ohio State, and
American Bar Associations.

nopoly" of a "general local

[taxicab] service" was outside
the scope of the Sherman Act.4
The case concerned an alleged conspiracy to limit entry into Chicago's
taxicab business by "freezing" and limiting taxicab licenses.
1. U.S. CONST. art I, § 8, c. 3. See generally Kallis, Local Conduct and the Sherman Act,
1959 DUKE L.J. 236; Searls, Trade or Commerce Among the Several States or With Foreign
Nations, 3 A.B.A. ANTrIRusT SECTION REP. 58 (1953); Speer, Application of the Federal
Antitrust Laws to Small Business in Michigan, 39 U. DET. L.J. 213 (1961); Note, The Commerce Clause and State Antitrust Regulation, 61 COLJM. L. REv. 1469, 1473-76 (1961).
See also HANDLER, CASES ON TRADE REGULATION 141-50 n.1 (3d ed. 1960); SCHWARTZ,
FREE ENTERPRISE AND ECONOMIC ORGANIZATION 23-25 (2d ed. 1959). "In general...
the states should have primary responsibility for restraints in retail distribution and wholesaling and manufacturing for essentially local consumption, as well as, of course, wholly intrastate restraints." Prefatory Note, p. 3 (Unpublished initial draft of the Uniform State Antitrust Act, Legislative Research Comm., Univ. of Mich. School of Law 1963). Emphasis added.
2. 26 Stat. 209 (1890), as amended, 50 Star. 693 (1937), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 1
(1958). Because this article is concerned principally with the approaches used by federal
courts in declining jurisdiction over competitive restraints, discussion will be confined to the
Sherman Act as the "bellwether" of federal jurisdiction over anticompetitive practices under
the commerce clause. The Federal Trade Commission Act § 5(a) (1), 38 Stat. 719 (1914),
as amended, 16 U.S.C. § 45(a) (1) (1960) ("in commerce"); the Clayton Act, 38 StaL
730-40 (1914), as amended, 15 U.S.C. §§ 12-27 (1958) ("any person engaged in commerce
in the course of such commerce"); and the Robinson-Patman Act, 49 Stat. 1526 (1936),
15 U.S.C. §§ 13-13(b), 1(a) (1958) ("any person engaged in commerce, in the course of
such commerce.") do not apply to activities merely affecting commerce. For limitations on
jurisdiction under the Robinson-Patman Act, see AUSTIN, PRICE DISsEMINATION 14-18
(1959).
Compare Willard Dairy Corp. v. National Dairy Prods. Corp., 309 F.2d 943 (6th
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This "local service" concept was articulated by the Court in the setting of a large metropolitan business, where cab operations require the
use of vehicles, fuels, lubricants, and components continuously drawn
from all parts of the United States. "Commerce" in its broadest sense
appears to have been involved in the alleged restraint. The Court, nevertheless, held that the taxicab business in Chicago was "too unrelated to
interstate commerce to constitute a part thereof within the meaning of
the Sherman Act."5 The efficacy of competition, the right of free entry
into business, and the benevolent fostering of "small business" continue
to be stated as social, political, and economic ends of the Sherman Act.'
The ruling by the Supreme Court, therefore, seems to be at variance with
the expressed 7 though often uncertain and self-contradictory' goals of
federal antitrust law.
It must follow from the Supreme Court's ruling in the Yellow Cab
case that some sort of "target area" of federal antitrust laws is contemplated. Otherwise, the impact of the federal laws might well bring before the federal courts every neighborhood business squabble. Hardware
Merchant A's rumor about his neighbor, Merchant B, may well effect the
sale of garden equipment in B's warehouse. Because the equipment
originated in an iron ore bed in Minnesota or Canada, Merchant B ordinarily should not be permitted to invoke the federal jurisdiction. Should
the result be different where Merchant A induces interstate suppliers of
Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 373 U.S. 934 (1963), with Moore v. Mead's Fine Bread Co., 348
U.S. 115 (1954). See also Federal Trade Commn v. Bunte Bros., 312 US. 349 (1941).
The Clayton Act has been held not to reach the outer limits of federal power. 1 TRADE REG.
REP. 5 2800, at 4013; cf. Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 337 U.S. 293, 297 (1949)
("the narrower Ace').
3. 332 U.S. 218 (1947).
4. Id. at 233. The "interstate commerce" toward -which this aspect of the complaint was
directed involved the embarkation upon and completion of interstate travel between homes,
offices, hotels, and railroad terminals. Such transportation is intermingled with the admittedly
local operations of the Chicago taxicabs.
5. Id. at 230.
6. In Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 4 (1958), Justice Black stated: "[The
Sherman Act) rests on the premise that the unrestrained action of competitive forces will yield
the best allocation of our economic resources, the lowest prices, the highest quality and the
greatest material progress, while at the same time providing an environment conducive to the
preservation of our democratic political and social institutions."
7. See, e.g., DIRLAM & KAmi, FAIR COMPEfTiON: THE LAW AND ECONOMICS OF ANTITRUST POLICY 15-17 (1954); KAYsEN & TURNER, ANTITRUST POLICY 11-18 (1959); MAsSEL, COMPETITION AND MONOPOLY ch. 2 (1962).
8. See, e.g., Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 337 U.S. 293, 318-21 (1949) (Douglas, J.;
dissenting); MEANS, PricingPower and the Public Interest, in SENATE SUBCOMM. ON ANTITRUST AND MONOPOLY of the COMM. ON. THE JUDICIARY, 88TH CoNG., 1ST SEss. ADMINISTERED PRIcES: A COMPENDIUM ON PUBLIC POLICY 213, 215 (Comm. Print 1963);
Nourse, Government Discipline of Private Economic Power, in SENATE SUECOMM. ON ANTIn
TRUST AND MONOPOLY of the COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 88TH CONG., 1ST SESS., ADMIN.
ISTBRED PRIcEs: A COMPENDIUM ON PUBLIC POLICY 245, 247-50 (Comm. Print 1963).
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garden equipment to refuse to sell to Merchant B?9 Should it matter that
as a result of either competitive tort - the malicious rumor or the boycott - a substantial amount of merchandise actually or potentially flowing in commerce may have been affected?'" Should the result still be
different where the impact of either tort is alleged to have been the
actual or attempted conspiratorial destruction of a competitor "in commerce?""
The Court in Yellow Cab was careful to point out that its ruling upon
the particular restraint - the conspiracy to limit entry - would not be
determinative in a different restraint aimed at a "closer" connection with
the interstate phase of the transportation business in Chicago, e.g., a "conspiracy to burden or eliminate transportation of passengers to and from a
railroad station where interstate journeys begin and end .. ."2 Was the
Court then suggesting that the aim and thrust of the particular restraint
was the determinative factor in obtaining federal jurisdiction? 3
THE RESTRICTED AREA OF SEARCH FOR

A

HAVEN FROM ANTITRUST

The Supreme Court has refused to define clearly the outline of the
"target area."' 4 Where the per se restraints of price fixing, group boycotts, division of markets, and tying agreements appear before the Court
in a setting "closely related" to interstate transportation,"D commodity
9. E.g., Klor's, Inc. v. Broadway-Hale Stores, Inc., 359 U.S. 207 (1959) (holding such a
boycott to be illegal per se).
10. Cf. Caldwell-Clements, Inc. v. Cowan Publishing Corp., 130 F. Supp. 326 (S.D.N.Y.
1955). But cf. Swartz v. Forward Ass'n, 41 F. Supp. 294 (D. Mass. 1941). See generally
Callmann, Boycott v. Price War: Violation of the Antitrust Laws or Unfair Competition, 23
OrIO ST. L.J. 128 (1962); Grismore, Are Unfair Methods of Competition Actionable at the
Suit of a Competitor?, 33 MIcH. L. REV. 321 (1935).
11. Cf. Poller v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc., 368 U.S. 464 (1962); Binderup v. Pathe
Exch., Inc., 263 U.S. 291 (1923); Syracuse Broadcasting Corp. v. Newhouse, 236 F.2d 522
C2d Cir. 1956).
12. United States v. Yellow Cab Co., 332 U.S. 218, 233 (1947).
13. See DIRLAM & KAHN, FAIR COMPETITION: THE LAw AND ECONOMICS OF ANTITRUST
POLICY 49-55 (1954). The view of "intent" as crucial in the application of the rule of reasom is criticized in KAYWSN & TURNER, op. cit. supra note 7, at 210.
14.
In United States v. Employing Plasterers Ass'n, 347 U.S. 186, 189 (1954), the Court
said: "Where interstate commerce ends and local commerce begins is not always easy to decide
and is not decisive in Sherman Act cases." In Mandeville Island Farms, Inc. v. American
Crystal Sugar Co., 334 U.S. 219, 234 (1948), the Court emphasized the lack of significance
of the determination: "[TJhe inquiry whether the restraint occurs in one phase or another,
interstate or intrastate, of the total economic process is now merely a preliminary step, except
for those situations in which no aspect of or substantial effect upon interstate commerce can
be found in the sum of the facts presented." (Emphasis added.)
15. E.g., Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1 (1958) (preferential routing clauses
and "tying" agreements); United States v. Yellow Cab Co., 332 U.S. 218 (1947) (monopoly
of inter-terminal taxicab transportation); Northern Sec. Co. v. United States, 193 U.S. 197
(1904); United States v. Trans-Missouri Freight Ass'n, 166 U.S. 290 (1897) (freight ratefixing combination). Cf. Steers v. United States, 192 Fed. I (6th Cir. 1911) (conspiracy to
interfere with rail shipment of tobacco).
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pricing,"6 interstate market allocation, 7 and product "flow,"' 8 the jurisdictional issue has received little extensive consideration. The Court has
emphasized a "practical" and case-by-case approach.'"
The federal courts have not hesitated to apply the Sherman Act to
restraints "in the stream" of interstate commerce: the interstate movement
of goods and persons, 0 local exchanges,2 ' terminals, 2 and other "necks
of the bottle" of interstate commerce. The Supreme Court has decried any
suggestion that the prohibited restraints are only those which are applied
"all along the line of movement of interstate commerce." The Court has
stated the "affectation doctrine" bluntly and all-encompassingly:
16. E.g., United States v. Bausch & Lomb Optical Co., 321 U.S. 707 (1944); United States
v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150 (1940); Ethyl Gasoline Corp. v. United States, 309
U.S. 436 (1940); Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. John S. Park & Son Co., 220 U.S. 373 (1911).
But cf. Appalachian Coals, Inc. v. United States, 288 U.S. 344 (1933); Chicago Bd. of Trade
v. United States, 246 U.S. 231 (1918).
17. E.g., Federal Trade Comnm'n v. National Lead Co., 352 U.S. 419 (1957); United States
v. Trenton Potteries Co., 273 U.S. 392 (1927); Standard Sanitary Mfg. Co. v. United States,
226 U.S. 20 (1912); Addyston Pipe & Steel Co. v. United States, 175 U.S. 211 (1899).
18. E.g., Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 340 U.S. 231 (1951) (Robinson-Patman Act);
Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 337 U.S. 293, 315 (1949) (Clayton Act § 3). Recent
analysis of the "flow of commerce" doctrine and its application to pharmacists at the retail
level appears in Northern Cal. Pharmaceutical Ass'n v. United States, 306 F.2d 379 (9th Cir.),
cert. denied, 371 U.S. 862 (1962); United States v. Utah Pharmaceutical Ass'n, 201 F. Supp.
29 (C.D. Utah), af!'d nzem., 371 U.S. 24 (1962).
19. Swift & Co. v. United States, 196 U.S. 375, 398 (1905) ("[C]ommerce among the States
is not a technical legal conception, but a practical one, drawn from the course of business.");
Apex Hosiery v. Leader, 310 U.S. 469, 509 (1940). In United States v. Yellow Cab Co.,
332 U.S. 218, 231 (1947), the court stated: "[I]nterstate commerce is an intensely practical
concept drawn from the normal and accepted course of business .... We must accordingly
mark the beginning and end of a particular kind of interstate commerce by its own practical
considerations." The "practicalities" also have provoked dissents in the Court. See, e.g.,
United States v. Employing Plasterers Ass'n, 347 U.S. 186, 200 (1954), where Justices
Douglas and Minton dissented.
20. E.g., Radovich v. National Football League, 352 U.S. 445 (1957) (professional football); United States v. International Boxing Club, Inc., 348 U.S. 236 (1955) (professional
championship boxing); United States v. Shubert, 348 U.S. 222 (1955) (theatrical business);
Lorain Journal Co. v. United States, 342 U.S. 143 (1951) (newspapers); Binderup v. Pathe
Exch., Inc., 263 U.S. 291 (1923) (motion picture films). Contra, Toolson v. New York
Yankees, Inc., 346 U.S. 356 (1953) (professional baseball).
21. E.g., United States v. Patten, 226 U.S. 525 (1913) (New York Cotton Exchange);
Rogers v. The Douglas Tobacco Bd. of Trade, Inc., 266 F.2d 636 (5th Cir. 1959) (tobacco
warehouse auction); Gamco, Inc. v. Providence Fruit & Produce Bldg., Inc., 194 F.2d 484
(1st Cir.), cert. denied, 344 U.S. 817 (1952) (wholesale fresh produce center and terminal);
United States v. Insurance Bd., 144 F. Supp. 684 (N.D. Ohio 1956) (boycott by county
association of insurance agents).
22. E.g., United States v. Terminal R-R. Ass'n, 227 U.S. 683 (1912) (memorandum de.
cision); Chicago No. W. Ry. v. Peoria & Pekin Union Ry., 319 F.2d 117 (7th Cir. 1963)
(pooling of terminal and switching operations not approved by I.C.C.); Norfolk So. Bus
Corp. v. Virginia Dare Transp. Co., 159 F.2d 306 (4th Cir. 1947); cf. Greater Baton Rouge
Port Comm'n v. United States, 287 F.2d 86 (5th Cir. 1961) (same). For a discussion of
the problems of the regulated industries and the role of administrative agencies in antitrust
regulation and enforcement, see generally Mitchell, Primary Jurisdiction- what it is and what
it is not, 13 A.B.A. AN'TrusT SEcTIoN REP. 26 (1958); Weston, Developments in Antitrust During the Past Year, 21 A.B.A. ANTriRuST SEcTIoN RIEP. 46, 88-96, 162-63 (1962).
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The source of the restraint may be intrastate, as the making of a contract or combination usually is; the application of the restraint may be
intrastate, as it often is; but neither matters if the necessary effect is to
stifle or restrain commerce among the states. If it is interstate commerce
that feels the pinch,23it does not matter how local the operation which

applies the squeeze.

The classic formulation of the applicability of the Sherman Act in
terms of the volume of commerce also leaves little room for exemption.
The volume of commerce involved in the restraint has been held to be
irrelevant to the applicability of the statute.2 4 It would seem clear that
the search for a haven from antitrust laws in either a restricted concep(Em23. United States v. Women's Sportswear Mfrs. Ass'n, 336 U.S. 460, 464 (1949).
phasis added.) In Mandeville Island Farms, Inc. v. American Crystal Sugar Co., 334 U.S.
219, 234 (1948), the full sweep of the Commerce Clause was invoked: "[G]iven a restraint
of the type forbidden by the Act, though arising in the course of intrastate or local activities,
and a showing of actual or threatened effect upon interstate commerce, the vital question
becomes whether the effect is sufficiently substantial and adverse to Congress' paramount
policy declared in the Act's terms to constitute a forbidden consequence. If so, the restraint
must fall, and the injuries it inflicts upon others become remediable under the Act's prescribed
methods, including the treble damage provision." The Court then states that "the statute does
not confine its protection to consumers, or to purchasers, or to competitors, or to sellers. Nor
does it immunize the outlawed acts because they are done by any of these. Cf. United States
v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150 [1940]; American Tobacco Co. v. United States,
328 U.S. 781 [19463. The Act is comprehensive in its terms and coverage, protecting all
who are made victims of the forbidden practices by whomever they may be perpetrated. Cf.
United States v. South-Eastern Underwriters Ass'n, [322 U.S. 533 (1944))....
"Nor is the amount of the nation's sugar industry which the California refiners control
relevant, so long as control is exercised effectively in the area concerned, Indiana Farmer's
Guide Pub. Co. v. Prairie Farmer Pub. Co., 293 U.S. 268, 279 [1934]; United States v. Yellow
Cab Co., 332 U.S. 218, 225 [1947], the conspiracy being shown to affect interstate commerce
adversely to Congress' policy. Congress' power to keep the interstate market free of goods
produced under conditions inimical to the general welfare, United States v. Darby, 312 U.S.
100, 115 [1940], may be exercised in individual cases without showing any specific effect
upon interstate commerce, United States v. Walsh, 331 U.S. 432, 437, 438 [1946], it is enough
that the individual activity when multiplied into a general practice is subject to federal control,
Wickard v. Filburn, [317 U.S. 111 (1942)] ... or that it contains a threat to the interstate
economy that requires preventive regulation. Consolidated Edison Co. v. National Labor Relations Board, 305 U.S. 197, 221, 222 [1938]." Id. at 236.
24. "[The boycott] is not to be tolerated merely because the victim is just one merchant
whose business is so small that his destruction makes little difference to the economy." Klor's,
Inc. v. Broadway-Hale Stores, Inc., 359 U.S. 207, 213 (1959). "It is difficult to perceive
how or at what point the lower court would determine that the elimination of individual
enterpreneurs had passed permissible bounds. The [lower] court has failed to recognize that
the sum-total effect of the elimination of a number of individual traders as a result of many
diverse restraints is not negligible from the standpoint of public injury, even if in each case
the public may patronize numerous other traders. In our view, the result of such eliminations would be a most serious encroachment on that optimum economic environment at
which the Sherman Act aims. See Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 4-5."
Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae on petition for certiorari, p. 5, Klor's, Inc. v.
Broadway-Hale Stores, Inc., 359 U.S. 207 (1959). In United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil
Co., 310 U.S. 150, 224 n.59 (1940), Justice Douglas emphasized: "[T]he amount of interstate or foreign trade involved is not material (Montague & Co. v. Lowrey, 193 U.S. 38,
[1903]), since § 1 of the Act brands as illegal the character of the restraint not the amount of
commerce affected. Steers v. United States, [192 Fed. 1, 5 (6th Cir. 1915)] . . . Patterson v.
" See also the dissent by Justice
United States, [222 Fed. 599, 618-19 (6th Cir. 1915)].
Douglas in United States v. Columbia Steel Co., 334 U.S. 495, 537 (1948).
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don of "commerce" or a restricted dollar volume of commerce is heavilyweighted against the searcher.
It also is clear that the "commerce" conception has developed without hindrance from or relationship to a conscious allocation of functions
within the federal political framework. Neither the availability of state
regulation, nor considerations of whether state or local government
"ought" to regulate the particular commercial activity have generally
served to limit either the depth or scope of federal jurisdiction. If the
approach has been functional and practical, it is derived from the common sense of experienced jurists rather than from economics or political
science.25 Hence, most discussion of a proper role for state antitrust enforcement has not been in terms of a claim to exclusivity in any significant competitive sphere,26 but rather in terms of the feasibility of cooperative enforcement, despite possible "pre-emption" by federal regulation.
THE AFFECTATION DOCTRINE AND ITS RELATION TO

LocAL ACTIVITIES

It nevertheless is significant to the practicing lawyer that the federal
courts continue to exempt various local restraints from the Sherman Act.
The verbalization of such decisions describes the impact of the restraint
upon commerce as "remote and incidental"2T rather than "substantial and
direct."28 Interstate commerce is deemed unaffected by a merely "inddental" flow of supplies in interstate commerce to the local enterprise,

or by "travel in interstate commerce of customers of the local enterprise."29 In such cases, the impact upon commerce of boycotting or
price-fixing
is then described as "inconsequential," "remote," or "fortui0
tous.

'3

25. On the rather dim correlation between economics and antitrust, see KAYSEN & TtJNER,
AN
UST POLICY ch. 8 (1959); MASSEL, COMPETITION AND MONOPOLY 11-14 (1962);
Edwards, Use and Abuse of Economics in Antitrust Litigation, 20 A.B.A. ANI TRusT SECTION
REP. 38 (1962); Massel, Economic Analysis in Judicial Antitrust Decisions, 20 A.B.A. ANrITRUSr SECTION REP. 46 (1962).
26. Mantzoros, Federal-State Antitrust Jurisdiction, 9 N.Y.LF. 74 (1963); Mosk, State
Antitrust Enforcement and Coordination with Federal Enforcement, 21 A.B.A. ANTITUST
SECTION REP. 358 (1962); Sieker, The Role of the States in Antitrust Law Enforcement Some Views and Observations, 39 TEXAs L. REV. 873 (1961); Note, The Commerce Clause
and State Antitrust Regulation, 61 COLUM. L. REv. 1469 (1961).
27. E.g., Page v. Work, 290 F.2d 323 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 875 (1961); Albrecht v. Kinsella, 119 F.2d 1003 (7th Cir. 1941). In Lieberthal v. North Country Lanes,
Inc., TRADiE REG. REP. (1963 Trade Cas.) 5 70894, at 78586 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 12 1963), the
court stated the issue: "Does the amended complaint now show a conspiracy 'to restrain interstate trade and commerce as one thus affecting only purely local trade and commerce?' '"
28. Elizabeth Hosp. Inc. v. Richardson, 269 F.2d 167 (8th Cir. 1959); Spears Free Clinic
Hosp. for Poor Children v. Cleere, 197 F.2d 125 (10th Cir. 1952); cf. United States v.
Starlite Drive-In, Inc., 204 F.2d 422 (7th Cir. 1953).
29. See notes 27 & 28 supra.
30. E.g., Page v. Work, 290 F.2d 323 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 875 (1961);
Lawson v. Woodmere, Inc., 217 F.2d 148 (4th Cir. 1954); United States v. Starlite Drive-In,
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Such conclusory phrases obviously offer little guidance. The Supreme Court has offered few definitive guides in the determination of
when interstate commerce will be deemed to be "affected." Decision of
the issue in various factual settings has involved difficulty, confusion, and
some inconsistency. 3
Despite the general language of the Supreme Court giving broad
scope to the commerce clause, the opinions of the Court have failed to
answer many vital questions. For example: Where does interstate commerce begin and end?32 Is this inquiry one of fact or law?3 3 What, if
any, presumptions are used? How are the facts to be determined? The
Inc., 204 F.2d 419 (7th Cir. 1953); Ruddy Brooks Clothes Inc. v. British & Foreign Marine
Ins. Co. 195 F.2d 86 (7th Cir. 1952); Albrecht v. Kinsella, 119 F.2d 1003 (7th Cit. 1941);
United States v. South Fla. Asphalt Co., TRADE REG. REP. (1962 Trade Cas.) 9 70257, at
76008 (S.D. Fla. 1962); Monument Bowl, Inc. v. Northern Cal. Bowling Proprietors' Ass'n,
197 F. Supp. 208 (N.D. Cal. 1961); Tobman v. Cottage Woodcraft Shop, 194 F. Supp. 83
(S.D. Cal. 1961); United States v. San Francisco Elec. Contractors Ass'n, 57 F. Supp. 57
(N.D. Cal. 1944).
31. Lieberthal v. North Country Lanes, Inc., TRADE REG. REP. (1963 Trade Cas.) a 70894,
at 78586 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 12, 1963). Conflicting results with similar factual issues frequently appear, e.g., fixing admission prices by local drive-in movie operators: United States
v. Starlite Drive-In, Inc., 204 F.2d 419 (7th Cir. 1953) (no effect upon commerce). Contra,
United States v. Central States Theatre Corp., TRADE REG. REP. (1960 Trade Cas.) 5 69836,
at 77274 (D. Neb. 1960). Restrictive agreements between contractors association and labor
unions: Albrecht v. Kinsella, 119 F.2d 1003 (7th Cir. 1941) (agreement to work only for
members of contractors' association, causing plaintiff to cease importing materials from another state, had "remote and incidental" effect upon commerce); cf. United States v. Employing Plasters Ass'n, 347 U.S. 186 (1954). Retail sales by service stations to interstate travelers: Dunkel Oil Corp. v. Ornich, TRADE REG. RlEP. (1944-45 Trade Cas.) 5 57306, at 57545
(R1D. IUl. 1944) (interstate business). But cf. Munson v. Richfield Oil Corp., 91 F. Supp.
171 (S.D. Cal. 1950) (interstate business). The foregoing are only a few examples of
apparently inconsistent results.
32. See note 14 supra.
33. Las Vegas Plumbers Ass'n v. United States, 210 F.2d 732 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 347
U.S. 817 (1954) distinguished between the "in commerce" import of the restraint as an
issue for the court and the "affectation doctrine" as an issue of fact for the jury. Cf. United
States v. General Motors Corp., 121 F.2d 376, 398, 402 (7th Cr. 1941) (G.M.A.C. litigation where the impact of the conspiracy on commerce was left to the jury). The instruction
of the trial judge is reproduced in Ford Motor Co. v. United States, 335 U.S. 303, 316 n.3
(1948). In Mandeville Island Farms, Inc. v. American Crystal Sugar Co., 334 U.S. 219, 249
(1948), however, Justice Jackson dissented from the Courts determination of the "affecta'tion" issue on the basis of the pleadings without evidence. The better rule was established in
Marks Food Corp v. Barbara Ann Banking Co., 274 F.2d 934, 936 (9th Cir. 1960), where
the court heard the separate issue of jurisdiction in a case where a jury was demanded. In
reversing, the reviewing court stated: "In the consideration of these points, we must first
note that the trial court in proper circumstances, has the right to order separate trials for
separate issues in the same case, F. R. Civ. P. 42(b), 28 U.S.C.A. We also assume that
when this is done in a non-jury case or one in which a jury has been waived, the judge has
the power and the duty to receive all proper evidence offered and determine the questions
of law and fact which are involved in the separated issue or issues. The rule however, as it
seems to us does not sanction the switching of the separated issue in a jury case from the jury
to the judge. It may be that this can be done in cases where the very stating of the separated
issue shows it to be so frivolous that but the one view is entertainable by reasonable minded
persons. The issue in this case is not of that quality. It seems to us that a safe practice
would be never to separate the subject matter jurisdiction issue for separate trial in cases where
the factual merits of the case must be considered in deciding the separated issue."

19631

Krotinger, The "Essentially Local" Doctrine

Court's verbalizations
vary from case to case and are at times self-con34
tradictory.

There is no procedural uniformity in the lower courts in passing upon
the jurisdictional plea of "local commerce." Some courts decide the issue
upon motion to dismiss35 or summary judgment.36 Others feel constrained
to defer decision on the ground that antitrust cases should not be decided
by summary procedures.3
The uncertainty of the decisional process is
illustrated by the diverse paths by which the Supreme Court has arrived
at conclusions of "no federal jurisdiction" in two landmark opinions.
One decision was arrived at after a searching trial. The other illustrates
an a priori approach. Both approaches indicate the types of facts which
courts may utilize.
The Factual Approach
The fields of physician affiliation, local medical society activity, and
hospital operation and qualification are outside the scope of section 1 of
the Sherman Act.3" United States v. Oregon State Medical Soc'y3" was
commenced under the Sherman Act against the organized medical pro34. Compare the sweeping basis for jurisdiction articulatd by Justice Douglas in United
States v. Socony-Oil Vacuum Co., 310 U.S. 150 (1940), with the Court's disregard of the
"spasmodic" interstate payments in United States v. Oregon State Medical Soc'y, 343 U.S. 326
(1952).
35. E.g., Riggall v. Washington County Medical Soc'y, 249 F.2d 266 (8th Cir.), cort.
denied, 355 U.S. 954 (1957); Lieberthal v. North Country Lanes, Inc., TRADE REG. REP.
(1963 Trade Cas.) 9 70894, at 78586 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 12, 1963); United States v. South
Fla. Asphalt Co., TRADE REG. REP. (1962 Trade Cas.) 5 70257, at 76008 (S.D. Fla. 1962);
Monument Bowl, Inc. v. Northern Cal. Bowling Proprietors' Ass'n, 197 F. Supp. 208 (N.D.
Cal. 1961); Tobman v. Cottage Woodcraft Shop, 194 F. Supp. 83 (S.D. Cal. 1961); Alexander v. Texas Co., 149 F. Supp. 37 (D. La. 1957); Interborough News Co. v. Curtis Publishing Co., 127 F. Supp. 286 (S.D.N.Y. 1954), af'd, 225 F.2d 289 (2d Cit. 1955).
36. E.g., Page v. Work, 290 F.2d 323 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 363 U.S. 875 (1961); Savon
Gas Stations No. 6, Inc. v. Shell Oil Co., 203 F. Supp. 529 (D. Md.), aff'd, 309 F.2d 306
(4th Cit. 1962), cert. denied, 372 U.S. 911 (1963) Myers v. Shell Oil Co., 96 F. Supp. 670
(S.D. Cal. 1951) (Robinson-Patman Act case).
37. Donlan v. Carvel, 209 F. Supp. 829, 831 (D. Md. 1962), where the court said: "It
should be noted... that summary dismissal in private antitrust litigation should be sparingly
granted, because of the nature of the issues and the availability of proof . . . . (Citations
omitted.)"
38. Elizabeth Hosp., Inc. v. Richardson, 269 F.2d 167 (8th Cit. 1957); Riggall v. Washington County Medical Soc'y, 249 F.2d 266 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 954 (1957);
Spears Free Clinic & Hosp. for Poor Children v. Cleere, 197 F.2d 125 (10th Cir. 1952).
Section 3 of the Sherman Act applies unqualifiedly to contracts, combinations, and conspiracies in restraint of trade or commerce in the District of Columbia. Interstate commerce is not necessary to the operation of the statute there. A conspiracy was formed between medical corporations and members designed to eliminate a group health association
which provided for medical care on a cash-sharing prepayment basis. Members were expelled from their association when they participated in group practice. Moreover, they were
denied the use of hospitals and facilities. The court stated that this was an unlawful restraint
in violation of § 3. United States v. American Medical Ass'n, 110 F.2d 703 (D.C. Cit. 1940),
convictions upheld, 130 F.2d 233 (D.C. Cir. 1942), affl'd, 317 U.S. 519 (1943). State antitrust laws have been held to apply to boycotting practices by medical societies. Willis v.
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fession of Oregon. The defendants in the action were the state and
county medical societies and their prepaid medical-care company. The
Government's complaint charged the defendants with monopolization of
prepaid medical care and boycotting of private medical-care associations.
Furthermore, the defendants were accused of conspiring to restrain competition between the state society's prepaid medical-care company and
plans sponsored by county medical societies. The evidence failed to show
monopolization, since the private health associations' prepaid care plans
were not adversely affected.
In affirming the trial court's decision, the Supreme Court also held
that since the doctor's sponsored plans did not constitute an unlawful
restraint, such plans were outside the scope of "commerce." The Court
referred to a "number of payments" to out-of-state doctors and hospitals,
"presumably for the treatment of policy-holders who happen to remove
or temporarily be away" from Oregon when the need for care arose.
These payments were dismissed as "few, sporadic and incidental."4'
The court contrasted the noncompetitive restraints between state and
county medical care societies with commercial noncompetitive agreements:
This is not a situation where suppliers of commercial commodities divide territories and make reciprocal agreements to exploit only the allotted market, thereby depriving allocated communities of competition.
This prepaid plan does not supply to, and its allocation does not with-

hold from, any community medical service or facilities of any description. No matter what organization issues the certificate, it will be performed, in the main, by the local doctors. The certificate serves only to

prepay their fees. The result, if the state association should enter into
local competition with the county association, would be that the inhabi-

tants could prepay medical services through either one or two medical
society channels.

There is not the least proof that duplicating sources

of the prepaid certificates would make them cheaper, more available or
would result in an improved service or have any beneficial effect on anybody. Through these nonprofit organizations the doctors of each
locality, in practical effect, offer their services and hospitalization on a

prepaid basis instead of on the usual cash fee or credit basis. To hold

it illegal because they do not offer their services simultaneously and in
the same locality through both a state and a county organization would

be to require them to compete with themselves in sale of certificates.
Under the circumstances proved here, we cannot regard the agreement
by these nonprofit organizations not to compete as an unreasonable re-

straint of trade in violation of the Sherman Act.4 '

The comments of the Court appear to make a clear distinction between the local practice of a profession and an interference with "comSanta Ana Community Hosp. Ass'n, TRADE 1RG. REP. (1962 Trade Cas.) 5 70328, at 76294
(4th Cir. 1962); Hubbard v. The Medical Service Corp., 59 Wash 2d 449, 367 P.2d 1003
(1962).

39.

343 U.S. 326 (1952).

40.
41.

Id. at 339.
Id. at 337-38.
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merce" in prepaid medical care plans. Had the evidence shown that the
physicians, by boycott in support of their own plans, did, in fact, adversely affect private prepaid care plans, a different result might well have
been forthcoming, for interstate competition in prepaid medical insurance
plans is wide-spread.4"
The A Priori Approach
In contrast to the intensely factual examination on appeal in the
Oregon State Medical Soc'y case, the Court, in the first Yellow Cab4"
case, by way of judicial notice, made a sweeping finding as to the normal
operating course of local taxicab companies licensed for operation by a
municipality. The Court based its decision principally on the following
facts: taxicab businesses do not cross state lines; are legally obligated to
operate only within the city; are paid fares by the passenger and not by
carriers in interstate commerce; are but one means of conveyance to
arteries of interstate commerce; and intermingle local passengers with
interstate travelers.
The Court appears to have been impressed principally by the proposition that a taxicab trip is not "commonly understood" to be part of
interstate travel.4 The Court arrived at its conclusion without any evidentiary bases and despite its frequently reiterated pronouncements that,
given the violation of law, interference with any amount of commerce is
prohibited.
Favorably contrasting with the ruling in Yellow Cab, the Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit held that a conspiracy in the linen supply
business in the New York and northern New Jersey metropolitan areas
sufficiently affected interstate commerce, although only one per cent of
all linen service in the market area was affected by the conspiracy. The
court noted that even though the one per cent amounted to sales of only
$523,168 in 1954, such a volume of business was not "insignificant
or insubstantial."4 5 It is suggested that most people would consider the
linen supply business as "essentially local."
The "essentially local" approach of the Yellow Cab case continues to
appear in recent cases sustaining the "no jurisdiction" defense. It has
been held that local activities such as bowling,4" ice and cold storage facil42. Cf. Travelers Health Ass'n v. Federal Trade Comm'n, 298 F.2d 820 (8th Cir. 1962),
following reversal in 362 U.S. 293 (1960); Federal Trade Comm'n v. National Gas. Co.,

357 U.S. 560 (1958).
43. 332 U.S. 218 (1947). See text accompanying notes 3-5 supra.
44. "From the standpoints of time and continuity, the taxicab trip may be quite distant and
separate from the interstate journey. To the taxicab driver, it is just another local fare." Id.
at 233.
45. United States v. Consolidated Laundries Corp., 291 F.2d 563 (2d Cir. 1961).
46. Lieberthal v. North Country Lanes, Inc., TRADE REG. REP. (1963 Trade Gas.) 9 70894,
at 78584 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 12, 1963); Monument Bowl, Inc. v. North Cal. Bowling Proprietors' Ass'n, 197 F. Supp. 208 (N.D. Cal. 1961).
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ities, 47 barbering,48 exclusive leasing arrangements in a local shopping
center,49 restrictive installation practices by cemeteries," undertaking,5
and employment agencies52 are outside the scope of federal antitrust.
Most of the foregoing cases were decided upon motions to dismiss. In
these cases of "essentially local" activities, the courts have regarded as
immaterial the fact that the local activity may attract interstate customers
or involve the use of components which have come from outside the state.
The a priori approach often is combined with the doctrine that the
goods in question have "come to rest" before the restraint was applied
locally.53 It should be noted, however, that the a priori approach is a
blunt weapon. It also is used by the courts in finding an adverse effect
upon commerce, especially in the per se cases.54
After the recent caveat against summary adjudications of antitrust
cases by the Supreme Court in Poller v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., 55
and White Motor Co. v. United States,5" it would seem that the jurisdictional issue of "commerce" should be decided only after a factual hearing
on the issue or by summary judgment where uncontroverted facts appear.
47. Atlantic Co. v. Citizens Ice & Cold Storage Co., 178 F.2d 453 (5th Cir. 1949), cert.
denied, 339 U.S. 953 (1950) (Robinson-Patman Act) (facts from affidavits in support of
preliminary injunction).
48. Hotel Phillips, Inc. v. Journeymen Barbers, 195 F. Supp. 664 (W.D. Mo. 1961), aff'd,
301 F.2d 443 (8th Cir. 1962).
49. Savon Gas Stations No. 6, Inc. v. Shell Oil Co., 203 F. Supp. 529 (D. Md. 1962),
a~f'd, 309 F.2d 306 (4th Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 372 U.S. 911 (1963) (motion for summary judgment); cf. Gaylord Shops, Inc. v. Pittsburgh Miracle Mile Town & Country Shopping
Center, Inc., TRADE REG. REP. (1963 Trade Cas.) J 70853, at 78463 (W.D. Pa. July 1,
1963) (discrimination in leasing of shopping center facilities).
50. Lawson v. Woodmere, 217 F.2d 148 (4th Cir. 1954); Northern Cal. Monument Dealers' Ass'n v. Interment Ass'n, 120 F. Supp. 93 (N.D. Cal. 1954).
51. Coulter Funeral Home, Inc. v. Cherokee Life Ins. Co., 32 F.R.D. 358 (ED. Tenn.
1963).
52. Darnell v. Markwood, 220 F.2d 374 (D.C. Cir. 1954).
53. United States v. South Fla. Asphalt Co., TRADE REG.. REP. (1962 Trade Cas.) 5 70257,
at 76008 (S.D. Fla. 1962); Tobman v. Cottage Woodcraft Shop, 194 F. Supp. 83 (S.D. CaL
1961).
54. Interstate commerce was deemed adversely affected in United States v. Employing Plasters
Ass'n, 347 U.S. 186 (1954); Mandeville Island Farms, Inc. v. American Crystal Sugar Co., 334
U.S. 219 (1948); United States v. Northeast Tex. Chapter, Nat'l Elec. Contractors Ass'n,
181 F.2d 30 (5th Cir. 1950); United States v. Detroit Sheet & Metal Roofing Contractors
Ass'n, 116 F. Supp. 81 (E.D. Mich. 1953); United States v. Universal Milk Bottle Serv.,
83 F. Supp. 622 (S.D. Ohio 1949). The tendency of the federal courts to take jurisdiction in
cases involving per se restraints is augmented by the ruling of the Supreme Court in Northern
Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5 (1958): "This principle of per se unreasonableness
not only makes the type of restraints which are proscribed by the Sherman Act more certain
to the benefit of everyone concerned, but it also avoids the necessity for an incredibly complicated and prolonged economic investigation into the entire history of the industry involved, as well as related industries, in an effort to determine at large whether a particular
restraint has been unreasonable - an inquiry so often wholly fruitless when undertaken."
55. 368 U.S. 464 (1962).
56. 372 U.S. 253 (1963).
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Factual Determination of the Impact of the Restraint
Page v. Work
The approach in recent cases wherein the defense of "nonaffectation" has been established appears to lie in an intensely factual analysis
of the business generally and, particularly, in an analysis of the phase of
the business which is alleged to have been unlawfully restrained. This
technique, if more widely accepted, may serve to expand the scope of
federal antitrust immunity.
In Page v. Work,5" decided by the Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit, an action was brought on behalf of a dissolved newspaper corporation which had engaged primarily in the publication of legal news
and advertising in the Los Angeles County area. Plaintiff alleged that
105 community newspapers and their coordinating bureau had injured
the corporation by price-fixing, collusive bidding, and by a variety of
anticompetitive practices aimed at destroying and excluding non-bureau
members. The efforts of the bureau in localizing the publication of
legal notices in each community of the county were successful, causing
the assets of plaintiff corporation to be sold to a wholly owned subsidiary
of the bureau.
The dissolved corporation and the 105 community newspapers were
engaged in interstate commerce by reason of their practice of purchasing
newsprint and supplies from sources located outside of California, the
dissemination of national news and national advertising, and by sales to
a few out-of-state subscribers. The only field of effective competition
between plaintiff and defendants, however, was in the legal advertising
business.
In affirming summary judgments in favor of defendants, the court
of appeals concluded:
(1) The test of federal jurisdiction is not whether the acts complained of affect a business engaged in interstate commerce, but whether
the conduct complained of affects the interstate commerce of such business.
(2) The relevant market is not the newspaper business as a
whole, but the legal advertising in newspapers printed, published, and
circulated in Los Angeles County.
Since the frame of relevancy for federal jurisdiction is the
(3)
local legal advertising market, the complainants' contention that the legal
advertising market was an "integral part" of the "flow of commerce"
was not justified.
(4) The charges of price-fixing, market division, and other practices, although constituting per se violations of section 1 of the Sherman
57.

290 F.2d 323 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 875 (1961).
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Act, confer federal jurisdiction only when the intrastate activity of publishing legal notices affects interstate commerce.
(5) No "direct and substantial" effect upon commerce was present
since there was no showing that the interstate market for newsprint
was appreciably affected. Moreover, the corporations' out-of-state circulation was de minimis.
(6)
The local legal advertising business was insufficient in scope
to allow defendants to "gain control" of interstate markets in national
display advertisements, news dissemination, or newsprint.
The court, therefore, concluded that the effects on interstate markets
were "indirect and nonexistent" and "of no substantial effect.""
The result of Page v. Work appears to be at variance with the cases
which have found a sufficient basis for jurisdiction under the antitrust
laws in a change of direction of interstate commerce.59 The court did
not concern itself with the realignment of a substantial volume of newsprint, national advertising, and national news. Moreover, the court's
ruling appears to ignore the fact that the aim of many combinations
and conspiracies is to obtain a greater share of the interstate commerce
market.6"
Page v. Work suggests that anticompetitive practices may achieve
immunity from antitrust laws by concentrating only upon the local
activities of a business which has significant interstate as well as local
facets. Whether a business is vulnerable to competitors in its local or
its interstate commerce aspects may often be wholly fortuitous.
The reasoning in Page v. Work further suggests that the "affectation"
doctrine also may be utilized to accomplish a resurrection of the "public
injury" doctrine under the guise of finding a "remote" or "insubstantial"
effect on commerce. This doctrine presumably was consigned to oblivion by the ruling of the Supreme Court in Klor's Inc. v. BroadwayHale Stores, Inc.61 In that case, a boycott of goods against a retail outlet was actionable, irrespective of the impact of the boycott on the local
retail competitive market. Local restraints applied to the actual move58. Id. at 333-34.
59. In United States v. Starlite Drive-In, Inc., 204 F.2d 419, 421 (7th Cir. 1953), affirming the dismissal of an indictment, the court pointed out that "there is no charge . . . that
films were licensed in any manner different from what they would have been if no restraint
had been imposed." Factors adduced as proof of a "substantial effect" upon commerce are: "an
increase of price to consumer; a reduction of amount of consumption; an impairment of
quality; a decrease in interstate movement; a change of direction of interstate movement; a
retardation of flow of interstate movement; a narrowing of markets; a burdening of interstate
movement; an impairment of benefits of free competition; and an elimination of price competition." Kallis, Local Conduct and the Sherman Act, 1959 DuKE L.J. 236, 248. (Footnotes omitted.)
(Appears as list.)
60. 75 HARV. L. REV. 1233, 1235 (1962).
61. 359 U.S. 207 (1959); see Handler, Recent Antitrust Developments, 14 RECORD OF

N.Y.CB.A. 318, 347-48 (1959).
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ment of goods in commerce may afford a distinction between Klor's Inc.,
and Page v. Work. The distinction is unconvincing, however, because
of the many rulings which have held that wholly local restraints and
discriminations applied to many-faceted businesses involving interstate and
intrastate activity are subject to the jurisdiction of the Sherman Act.62
Local Segments of
National Marketing Organizations
While the judicial tendency to insulate "essentially local" enterprises
from federal jurisdiction has been on the increase, a contrary tendency
or trend is perceptible in connection with local segments of multistate
marketing organizations. In many cases, the activities of the local automobile,'a gasoline," or soft drink dealers 5 have been characterized as
"essentially local" in character. While the marketing practices of the
supplier corporation through retail outlets have been regarded as part of
the "stream of commerce" for purposes of federal jurisdiction, " the
status of the individual dealer or distributor as party plaintiff pursuant
to section 4 of the Clayton Act had received quite contrary consideration.
With an increasing articulation by the courts that refusals to deal may
not be utilized for the accomplishment of antitrust objectives, " and with
62. E.g., United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 334 U.S. 131 (1948); United States v.
Griffith, 334 U.S. 100 (1948); United States v. Crescent Amusement Co., 323 U.S. 173
(1944); Interstate Circuit, Inc. v. United States, 306 U.S. 208 (1939).
63. Miller Motors, Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 252 F.2d 441 (4th Cir. 1958); Hudson Sales
Corp. v. Waldrip, 211 F.2d 268 (5th Cir. 1954); Fedderson Motors, Inc. v. Ward, 180 F.2d
519 (10th Cir. 1950); Boro Hall Corp. v. General Motors Corp., 124 F.2d 822, rehearing denied, 130 F.2d 196 (2d Cit. 1942); Blenke Bros. Motors, Inc. v. Chrysler Corp., 189 F. Supp.
420 (N.D. Ill.
1960); Riedley v. Hudson Motor Car Co., 82 F. Supp. 8 (W.D. Ky. 1949).
64. Mitchell v. Livingston & Thebaut Oil Co., 256 F.2d 757 (5th Cir. 1958); Myers v.
Shell Oil Co., 96 F. Supp. 670 (S.D. Cal. 1951); Alexander v. Texas Co., 165 F. Supp. 53
(W.D. La. 1959); Brenner v. Texas Co., 140 F. Supp. 240 (N.D. Cal. 1956). But cf. Ryan
v. California Co., TRADE REG. REP. (1957 Trade Cas.) 5 68651, at 72643 (D. Mont. 1957).
See also cases cited at note 31 supra. In Savon Gas Stations No. 6, Inc. v. Shell Oil Co., 203
F. Supp. 529, 534 (D. Md.), aff'd, 309 F.2d 306 (4th Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 372 U.S.
911 (1963), the court stated: "MIThe decided cases indicate that the retail sale of gasoline,
and related products, is intrastate in character."
65. Brosius v. Pepsi-Cola Co., 155 F.2d 99 (3d Cir. 1946). But cf. Red Rock Cola Co. v.
Red Rock Bottlers, Inc., 195 F.2d 406 (5th Cir. 1952).
66. E.g., Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 337 U.S. 293 (1943); Osborn v. Sinclair Ref.
Co., 286 F.2d 832 (4th Cir. 1960), rehearing denied, 286 F.2d 832 (4th Cir. 1961), cert.
denied, 366 U.S. 963 (1961); United States v. General Motors Corp., 121 F.2d 376 (7th Cir.
1941); In re Sun Oil Co., TRADE REG. REP. (F.T.C. Complaints, Orders, Stipulations 19611963) 5 16418 (F.T.C. Docket of Complaints Dkt. 6934, at 25401 (1963).
67. Walker Distrib. Co. v. Lucky Lager Brewing Co., TRADE REG. REP. (1963 Trade Cas.)
9 70886, at 78559 (9th Cir. Sept. 6, 1963) (conspiracy to prevent purchase and sale of
rival beers); A. C. Becken Co. v. Gemex Corp., 272 F.2d 1 (7th Cir. 1959) (price fixing);
Englander Motors, Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 267 F.2d 11 (6th Cit. 1959) (maintain exclusive
dealing system). But cf. Simpson v. Union Oil Co., 311 F.2d 764 (9th Cir.), cert. granted,
373 U.S. 901 (1963).
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the substantial elimination of the "public injury" requirement for a
private treble damage action,68 the local outlet of the national chain has
achieved new importance.
TYING AGREEMENTS

The nature and volume of local commercial activity has become important, not only in ascertaining federal jurisdiction, but also in assessing
the legality of tying agreements pursuant to section 1 of the Sherman
Act.
In Northern Pac. Ry. v.United States,6" the Supreme Court clarified
the relationship between section 1 of the Sherman Act and tying agreements. The legality of a tying agreement is determined by the market
power of the tying product and the "substantiality" of commerce in
the "tied" product. In absorbing the "tying agreement" in the per se
category along with price-fixing, group boycotts, and division of markets,
the Court stated:
While there is some language in the Times-Picayune [Publishing Co. v.
United States, 345 U. S. 594 (1953)] opinion which speaks of "monopoly power" or "dominance" over the tying product as a necessary precondition for application of the rule of per se unreasonableness to tying
arrangements, we do not construe this general language as requiring anything more than sufficient economic power to impose an appreciable
restraint on free competition in the tied product (assuming all the time,
of course, that a "not insubstantial" amount of interstate commerce is
affected). To give it any other construction would be wholly out of accord with the opinion's cogent analysis of the nature and baneful effects
of tying arrangements and their incompatibility with the policies underlying the Sherman Act. Times-Picayune, of course, must be viewed in
context with International Salt [Co. v. United States, 332 U.S. 392
(1947) ] and our other decisions concerning tying arrangements. There
is no warrant for treating it as a departure from those cases. Nor did it
purport to be any such thing; rather it simply made an effort to restate
the governing considerations in this area as set forth in the prior cases.
And in so doing it makes dear, as do those cases, that the vice of tying
arrangements lies in the use of economic power in one market to restrict
competition on the merits in another, regardless of the source from
which the power 7is
derived and whether the power takes the form of a
0
monopoly or not.

The Court's extensive reliance upon and discussion of the International
68. Radovich v. National Football League, 352 U.S. 445, 453-54 (1957); United States v.
Employing Plasters Ass'n, 347 U.S. 186, 188-89 (1954). It is immaterial whether the
cause of action pleaded is or is not a per se violation of § 1. Walker Distrib. Co. v. Lucky
Lager Brewing Co., TRAnn REG.REP. (1963 Trade Cas.) 5 70886, at 78559 (9th Cir. Sept.
6, 1963). But cf. Ace Beer Distrib. v. Kohn, Inc., 318 F.2d 283 (6th Cir. 1963) (application for certiorari pending). See p. 70 supra. See also Halper, Individual Refusals to Deal:
Customer Selection or Dealer Protection?, 22 A.B.A. ANTmusT SECrION REP. 49 (1963);
Turner, The Definition of Agreement Under the Sherman Act: Conscious Parallelism and
Refusals to Deal, 75 HARV. L.REv.655 (1962).
69. 356 U.S. 1 (1958).
70. Id. at 11. (Emphasis added.)
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Salt case dearly emphasizes that as little as $500,000 of commerce in
the "tied" production was "not insubstantial." While White Motor Co.
v. United States7 and Brown Shoe Co. v. United States72 may cast doubt
upon an all encompassing inclusion of the tying arrangement in the
per se "dub,"'7 it is dear that the issue of illegality in the individual
case cannot arise unless the "substantiality" of the "tied" commerce is
apparent.
The prerequisites for pleading an illegal tying agreement recently
have been articulated in the District Court for the Southern District of
New York. In Albert H. Cayne Equipment Corp. v. Union Asbestos
& Rubber Co., 4 the plaintiff, an ousted exclusive distributor of defendant's steel shelving, alleged that the defendant had terminated plaintiff's
distributorship in reprisal for plaintiff's refusal to purchase "other products" sold by defendant.
In denying a motion for preliminary injunction and in dismissing the
complaint with leave to amend, the court stated:
Both of the foregoing conditions are essential before a tying arrangement offends Section I of the Sherman Act. The instant complaint,
however, fails to state any facts showing either UNARCO's economic
power over Sturdi-Bilt racks - the tying product - or restraint of a
substantial volume of commerce in the unidentified tied items. Indeed,
there is nothing in the complaint which even suggests any effect whatever of the tying arrangement on commerce, on competition, or its economic impact on the market for the tied items. The complaint, therefore,75fails to allege a claim for relief under Section 1 of the Sherman
ACt.

The court reconciled its holding with the "notice requirements" of
pleading under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure by stating that
while the "shallow, shot-gun, condusionary pleading' gave notice of
what the plaintiff claimed, the claim stated failed "to pass muster"
under the various specific sections of the antitrust laws invoked.
This ruling does not suggest a return to outmoded requirements of
pleadings in antitrust cases, which required more than "fair notice" of
the nature of plaintiff's claim. 6 In a tying agreement action, however,
it does portend the requirement that the pleader at least relate the tying
and tied products to the tests enunciated by the Supreme Court.
Two courts of appeals opinions seem to be in conflict with the
required showing of substantiality where the tied product moves through
a number of local outlets which individually do not involve a "substan71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
Cas.)

372 U.S. 253, 262 (1963).
370 U.S. 294 (1962).
Cf. Stedman, Tying Arrangements, 22 A.B.A. ANTITRJST SECTION REP. 64 (1963).
TRADE REG. REP. (1963 Trade Cas.) 5J70879, at 78539 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 23, 1963).
Id. at 78542.
See Walker Distrib. Co. v. Lucky Lager Brewing Co., TRADE REG. REP. (1963 Trade
5 70886, at 78559 (9th Cir. Sept. 6, 1963), and cases cited therein.
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tial" volume of commerce. In Osborn v. Sinclair Ref. Co.,77 the court reversed dismissal of a complaint arising out of the manufacturer's refusal
to continue selling to a dealer because of the latter's failure to accede
to Sinclair's demands to stock Goodyear tires, batteries, and accessories
(TBA).
The opinion of Judge Sobeloff states:
Turning to the instant case, buying substantial quantities of Goodyear
TBA clearly appears to have been a condition of the plaintiff's leasing
the service station and being a dealer in Sinclair gasoline. The Goodyear
TBA was tied to the lease and the sale of the gasoline. It matters not
that the plaintiff was not forced to purchase his entire requirements in
Goodyear merchandise. Certainly, insofar as he and other dealers were
compelled to carry Goodyear, to that extent competition in TBA was
78
curbed.

More recently, in Bragen v. Hudson County News Co.,79 the Court
of Appeals for the Third Circuit reversed the trial court's directed verdict at the conclusion of plaintiff's evidence. Defendant had a near
monopoly on the wholesale distribution of newspapers and periodicals
in Hudson County, New Jersey. Plaintiff operated a small retail store
in Jersey City selling newspapers, magazines, paper backs, comic books,
soft drinks, ice cream, candy, and school supplies. The plaintiff was
obviously a very small businessman.
Plaintiff proved that defendant required him to accept items which
he had not ordered. During the month that defendant became the sole
wholesale distributor of the most desirable newspaper and magazine
publications in Hudson County, it refused to deal further with plaintiff,
claiming that plaintiff owed a balance of $126.19. Plaintiff refused
to pay because defendant had continuously "short changed" him on
credit for returned and unwanted items which totalled between $550 and

$600.
After his business had diminished to the point where he was forced
to close his store, plaintiff brought suit. He alleged that numerous
customers stopped patronizing his store when they were no longer able
to purchase the newspapers and magazines distributed by defendant. The
evidence established a series of unavailing protests by the plaintiff, including numerous requests that defendant discontinue delivering unwanted items. Plaintiff also had protested against the quality of defendant's service, e.g., delivery of publications into gutters and unprotected
locations during rainy weather.
In reversing the directed verdict for defendant, the court of appeals

noted that a single exclusive distributorship for a number of publishers
was not necessarily illegal under either section 1 or section 2 of the
77.
78.
79.

286 F.2d 832 (4th Cir. 1961).
Id. at 838-39. (Emphasis added.)
TRADE REG. REP. (1963 Trade Cas.) 5 70875, at 78529 (3d Cir. Aug. 23, 1963).
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Sherman Act. The court, however, found a justiciable jury issue under
the "tying cases." Said the court:
In our opinion, the plaintiff has made a sufficient showing which could
enable a jury to find that Hudson's business with plaintiff was conducted through tying arrangements. Although Hudson agreed to give
credit on returned items, the jury might have concluded on all of the
evidence that the administration of this scheme was such that in actual
practice the credit concession did not relieve
the plaintiff of the eco80
nomic burden of unwanted 'tied' items.
The opinion of the court is devoid of discussion of the "substantiality" of the commerce affected by the defendant's practices. It would
seem that plaintiff should be required to show not only that he was
adversely affected, but that a substantial volume of commerce was affected by the defendant's practices.
CONCLUSION

It is clear that the standards of federal jurisdiction under the Sher-'
man Act have substantially ignored the possibility of remedies under"
state antitrust laws. The conception both of the national market and
the broad sweep of the commerce clause of the Constitution have impelled an approach by the federal courts which substantially precludes a
"states rights" or other parochial approach to "commerce" under theSherman Act.
Until recently, the enforcement of state antitrust laws has been all
but ignored in the establishment of a competitive economic atmosphere.
This failure of enforcement and the plethora of burdensome, special,
and conflicting state regulations s" - often at variance with the conception of a national market - appear to have justified the breadth of
jurisdiction envisioned by the federal government under the Sherman
Act.
The present uncertain and confused regulation and enforcement at
the state level indicates the advisability of a continuing broad jurisdiction
in the federal courts over problems of competition and antitrust. With
the rising tide of consciousness of state antitrust laws, effective argument
in the future perhaps may be available for a more restrictive attitude
toward federal jurisdiction.
80. Id. at 78533.
81.
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